The Convention of Kangawa
The Yedo government sent Governor Inouye and Overseer Iwase to hold conference at Kanagawa with Mr. Harris, the United States Consul-General at Shimoda.
From: 1858 C.E. To: 1858 C.E.
Location: Tokyo, Japan; Kyoto, Japan
Note: This article has been excerpted from a larger work in the public domain and shared here due to its historical value. It may contain outdated ideas and language that do not reflect TOTA’s opinions and beliefs.
From Agitated Japan: the Life of Baron Ii Kamon-No-Kami Naosuké by Shimada Saburo and Yoshimaro Satoh, 1896.
Chapter IV
The Tairo Ii Signs the American Treaty
On the assumption of the great responsibility of Tairo Naosuke found himself face to face with the two great problems which had agitated the whole country during several years. The solution of both now centred in his own person.
As to the appointment of the Shogun's Heir, Naosuke believed that the matter rested entirely with the Shogun himself. He looked on the question as that with which the subjects had nothing to do. Iyesada had his own desire already formed, but as he was extremely reserved by nature, and since he knew that there were many powerful princes and barons in favor of Prince Hitotsubashi, he dared not give any public expression to his feelings. In his new Tairo, however, he found a man who could carry out his wishes, and appoint as his heir the one on whom he had set his heart. On the 1st day of the 6th month, 1858, (July 11) a little over a month after Naosuke's installation into the office of Tairo preliminary notice of the appointment of the Prince of Kishiu as the Heir Apparent was given to Princes of the Tokugawa family and to the Barons of the land.
The date of public or national announcement was fixed on the eighteenth day of that month (July 29). The reason for this procedure was that the matter had to be presented for the Emperor's sanction, which however was a mere formality.
In those days of imperfect means of travelling, this period of eighteen days was required for a messenger to go up to Kioto and bring back an answer. According to calculation, the Imperial sanction would reach Yedo on the 14th day of the same month, if nothing occurred to prevent approval on the part of the Kioto Cabinet. In this case, however, the expected answer did not come even on the 15th.
Here a word of explanation may be necessary. The actual power of government was of course vested in the Shogun, but this did not nullify the sovereignty of the Emperor who had his capital in the city of Kioto, where he had his own Cabinet of Ministers and Counsellors. There were several things which had to receive the Imperial sanction, such as appointment of the Shogun's Heir, the granting of official rank, etc. The rank and title of the Shogun himself had not been self-assumed. Their only source was in the Emperor himself and the Yedo ruler was the Mikado's lieutenant.
In the course of two centuries and a half, the lease of power by the Shogunate had become so much like a permanent national institution that in time Imperial requests for sanction had settled into matters of polite routine. Although the Emperor had his own Cabinet, yet its Premier, Ministers, Counsellors, etc. existed only in name. They had little or nothing to say against anything done by the Shoguns.
This style of government, called in history, Bumon Seiji, or government by the military class, originated with Yoritomo, about seven hundred years ago, and after meeting with several changes and vicissitudes, it had come down with constant increments of power to the days of the Tokugawas.
Nevertheless, what had long been a shadow was now becoming a substance and the old body took on new life. Requests for imperial sanction ceased to be a mere formality from the moment the question of foreign intercourse rose into view. Henceforth the Kioto Cabinet showed that it would have a voice in the management of state affairs. The imperial Premier, or Dai-Jo-Dai-Jin, Great Minister of the Great Government was Prince Naotada.
The party of Prince Rekko, having representatives in Kioto, were busily engaged in influencing the Imperial Cabinet to veto the policy pursued by the Yedo government. The powerful princes and barons who favored the views of Prince Rekko, also made their influences felt on the Kioto Cabinet. The result of this double pressure was that among the Kuge, or Court nobles, several men of power and influence sided with the opposition to the Shogunate. The Imperial Premier, Prince Naotada, however, was not influenced by the opponents of the Yedo government, and he was the only support among the Imperial Cabinet on which Naosuke could rely.
As to the question of making a treaty with the American envoy, the party of exclusion which also supported the candidacy of Prince Hitotsubashi was busy in making its influences felt on the Imperial Cabinet.
Meanwhile the coming of the Mikado's sanction was awaited with anxious suspense at Yedo, but as it did not come, Naosuke dispatched a special message to Kioto.
Just at this unfortunate juncture, an express message reached Yedo, that two American men-of-war had come to Shimoda, and that one of them proceeded up the Bay of Yedo as far as Koshiba. This was on the 13th day of the month. (July 24, 1858). On the 16th day, (July 21,) another message came reporting an arrival of Russian war-ships, and saying also that they were soon to be followed by English and French squadrons which had been victorious in their war with China.
The Yedo government sent Governor Inouye and Overseer Iwase to hold conference at Kanagawa with Mr. Harris, the United States Consul-General at Shimoda. In this conference Mr. Harris pointed out the impossibility of exclusion, and the danger attending adherence to the traditional policy. The conference was closed by a request for speedy settlement of the treaty negotiations then under way. Assurances were given by the American representative of a friendly intervention in Japan's future intercourse with other powers of the West whereby she might obtain favorable terms with European nations.
The two commissioners returned to Yedo on the 19th day, (July 30) to report the result of their interview with the representative of the United States. The Shogunate now assembled its official advisers to discuss the great question which had been pending for several years. At this meeting they were all of opinion that the question had assumed such a form that only speedy settlement could save the nation from irreparable harm. Therefore, it would not only be better, but absolutely necessary, to act in the matter at once.
Here was the decisive moment not only in the history of the Tokugawa Shogunate, but of Great Japan itself.
Shall Naosuke, by virtue of the power vested in him, decide the question before obtaining a formal sanction of the Imperial Cabinet? The unsuccessful mission of Baron Hotta to the Imperial City was too recent an event to be forgotten by anybody. The renewed presentation of the same question would not only involve delays, but would surely meet with the same fate as on the former occasion. Naosuke believed that investment with the power of government; carried with it the right to meet emergencies according to the judgment of the person so invested. He also knew that the national safety and dignity were involved in this question. He therefore decided to assume the entire responsibility.
No sooner was the decision made than he immediately dispatched Inouye and Iwase to Kanagawa, authorizing them to sign the provisional treaty which has since been called the Temporary Kanagawa Treaty, which was to be subject to revision after a specified term of years, but which has never been changed in spite of the tens of years that have since elapsed, even after the point of time designated.
On the 21st day of the same month, (August 1st) Prince Bekko wrote a letter to the Tairo Naosuke, stating his anxiety as to the conduct of the Shogunate in the question of foreign intercourse. He also clearly stated the inadvisability of taking the decisive step of signing the treaty before the Imperial sanction was received. He advised that the acts of the Shogunate be limited to what was unavoidable and then to dispatch either the Tairo or some of the Senators as a messenger to Kioto to lay the matter before the Throne. Among other things he again clearly expressed his disapproval of permitting residence on the soil to the ministers of foreign nations or of allowing their nationals to trade.
According to the tenor of his letter, the Prince himself must have been aware of the impossibility of utter exclusion, for he advises the Yedo Cabinet to limit its conduct to "such parts as are entirely unavoidable."
Hence the difference between him and the Tairo may be considered as resting on the one point of "before" or " after" the coming of the Imperial sanction. Even in the time of Baron Hotta it had been impossible to obtain this, and now that the influence of Prince Rekko and the Exclusion Party had so increased, little success could be expected when the question should be brought before the Imperial Cabinet. Meanwhile procrastination at Kioto might have involved the whole country in serious consequences and irremediable calamities. Naosuke knew too well the kind of difficulty into which China had involved herself. He was prepared to risk his life rather than to see his country plunged in similar miseries which moreover might be attended with national shame.
On the 22nd day, (August 2) the Tairo dispatched a message to Kioto stating the impossibility of closing up the country to foreign intercourse, as well as the trouble and danger attending the exclusion. At the same time he gave assurances that the Shogunate would do its utmost to protect the coasts and insure safety for the whole land.
On the same day, the Princes and Barons were summoned to the Castle of Yedo, where the conduct of the Shogunate in reference to the treaty with the United States was publicly notified. The tenor of the notification was similar to that of the report sent to Kioto except the one clause which required them to state their views to the government in reference thereto. On the 23rd day, Naosuke himself wrote an answer to Prince Rekko, thanking him for his kind advice, but regretting his inability to follow his counsel owing to the unavoidable nature of the case in hand. He also fully stated the circumstances, asking the Prince's sympathy with him in the serious and difficult position in which he was now placed. He also humbly expressed his lack of ability for so important a post at such a crisis, and requested the Prince of Mito to oblige him with further counsels for the sake of the nation at large.
On this very same day, (23rd) the Imperial sanction for appointing the Prince of Kishiu to the Heir Apparent of the Shogun was received from Kioto. It was dated the 8th day, (July 19) and all other correspondences from Kioto under the same date reached Yedo on the 14th day (July 25).
Why was this one document containing the Imperial sanction delayed so long? In all probability it must have been purposely kept back by some of the opposition party with a view to effect their own end, yet, as it proved, without success.
A few days after this, the Chief of the Privy Recorder, Shiga, through whose hand the paper reached the Tairo, committed suicide. Nobody could explain his death at that time, but it was said to be in order to escape the punishment attending the withholding of the Imperial sanction.
The 25th day (August 6) had been fixed for the public announcement of the appointment of the Heir Apparent. But the Princes of Mito and Owari, and Baron Matsudaira of Echizen, as well as those of the same opinion with them still tried hard to have Prince Hitotsubashi appointed as the Heir.
On this day, changes took place in the Yedo Cabinet. The two Senators, Baron Hotta and Baron Matsudaira, were succeeded in their office by Barons Ota, Matsudaira of Nishiwo, and Manabe. The reason of the change was because Baron Hotta had lost the Shogun's confidence on account of his unsuccessful mission to Kioto, while Baron Matsudaira favored the candidacy of Prince Hitotsubashi.
The moment the conclution of the Temporary Treaty was made public, the exclusion party began to show an increased vehemence in their opposition. Baron Matsudaira of Echizen called on the Tairo Naosuke in his mansion and a long discussion took place, but before coming to any conclusion, the latter had to excuse himself, much to the former's dissatisfaction, for the hour came for him to go to the Court.
This was on the 24th day (August 4). On the same day, the Senior and Junior Princes of Mito, together with the Prince of Owari, suddenly presented themselves to the Castle or the Shogun's Court. Baron Matsudaira of Echizen, hearing of this sudden visit of the three Princes also followed them to the Castle.
In this era, there were certain days fixed for the appearance of respective Princes and Barons at the Shogun's Castle, or they were required to give due notice of so doing. This sudden visit of the three Princes was wholly contrary to the rule and usage of the times. The officers of the Court were naturally taken by surprise and when the matter was brought before the Cabinet, the Senator Baron Manabe said to the Tairo that the meaning of the sudden appearance of the three Princes was more than clear. The person whom they looked upon as the principal opponent being the Tairo, it would be better for the Senators to see the visitors without Naosuke, lest his presence should involve the matter in a serious complication.
Naosuke replied that his failure to see them, the Princes of Mho, and Owari, would be taken for timidity, and that the official dignity of the Tairo required him not to avoid this meeting.
The three Princes, two of Mito, and one of Owari, were admitted to the Hall of Audience where high dignitaries alone are permitted to come. The Lord of Echizen remained in an ante-room near by. Now took place one of the great events in the history of Ansei era (1854-1859). A rumor flew fast and wide that the Princes of Mito and Owari had suddenly appeared at the Castle to convince Naosuke of his great mistake and to require him to commit seppuku for his conduct.
The leaders of the two rival parties having now met face to face, nothing short of a hot discussion could be expected.
The debate was opened with the question of foreign intercourse. Prince Rekko blamed Naosuke for concluding the American treaty before the Imperial sanction had been received. But when the Tairo explained the irrepressible tendencies of the times and professed his confidence of meeting with Imperial approval under the circumstances, this subject could not be pressed any further.
The three Princes then began to show the need of the times for a full-grown able prince for the Shogun's heir. They said that none would be better qualified than Prince Hitotsubashi. To this, Naosuke simply replied that the right of appointing the Heir Apparent rested solely with the Shogun, and this rule left no room for any of his relations or of subjects to say aught against what he had appointed. He also stated that the matter of heirship having been already settled, and being ready for formal announcement on the following day (25th), it would be improper now to further discuss that affair.
Prince Rekko thereupon advised the Tairo to withhold the announcement of heirship for a time and thus manifest a proper sense of respect and deference toward the Imperial Cabinet, especially after the conduct of the Shogunate in concluding the American treaty before obtaining the Emperor's order.
Naosuke's reply was that he had perfect confidence that the matter would meet with the Emperor's approval, and that the long vacancy of the Shogun's heirship being against the Imperial will, he could not follow the advice of the Prince.
"Why does not Your Excellency dispatch a messenger to Kioto to explain the circumstances attending the conclusion of the treaty?" was the next question of Prince Rekko.
Naosuke answered that it had already been decided to send Senator Baron Manabe to Kioto, and that his official instructions would be given him on the following day.
The last subject which Prince Rekko brought up was his advice to appoint the Baron of Echizen to the office of the Tairo, to which Naosuke replied that in this question he was entirely powerless.
At this point the timely wit of Baron Manabe caused both parties, bitter rivals though they were, to close their interview amid unexpected laughter on both sides. Manabe's joke was this: "The number of the Honorable Houses of Tokugawa, besides the Shogun, is limited to three, how can anybody make the number four. There is only one office of Tairo, and I cannot see how it can be made into two." When written down or translated, the reason of the fun is not evident, yet the effect was powerful. Evidently the witticism must have been uttered in a way only known to the practiced joker.
During this interview Prince Rekko called aloud for Baron Matsudaira of Echizen, but Naosuke objected on the ground that his official standing did not entitle him to a place in the Hall of Audience. He also objected to the request of the Prince of Owari to have an interview with the Shogun, on the ground that the latter was too ill to see anybody.
Whatever enmity might have lurked in the breast of those men present at this interview, the gathering was brought to a peaceful close. Matsudaira of Echizen who was not admitted to the presence of the Tairo held a conference with Senator Baron Manabe, and after expressing the same views as those of Prince Rekko, also retired from the Court.
Saburo, Shimada and Yoshimaro Satoh. Agitated Japan: the Life of Baron Ii Kamon-No-Kami Naosuké. D. Appleton, 1896.
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